







“E-commerce, parcel delivery and environmental policy” 
 
Claire Borsenberger, Helmuth Cremer, Denis Joram,  
Jean-Marie Lozachmeur and Estelle Malavolti 
 
 
July 2021  
 
E-commerce, parcel delivery and environmental policy1
Claire Borsenberger2, Helmuth Cremer3, Denis Joram4
Jean-Marie Lozachmeur5 and Estelle Malavolti6
July 2021
1Helmuth Cremer, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur and Estelle Malavolti gratefully acknowledge the
funding received by TSE from ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements dAvenir
program). They have beneted from the nancial support of Groupe La Poste in the context
of the research foundation TSE-Partnership. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reect those of TSE-P or La Poste.
2Division of Regulation, Competition and Institutional A¤airs, Groupe La Poste
3TSE, University of Toulouse Capitole
4Division of Regulation, Competition and Institutional A¤airs, Groupe La Poste
5TSE, CNRS and University of Toulouse Capitole
6TSE, ENAC
Abstract
We study the design of environmental policy in the e-commerce sector and examine two
main questions. First, what is the appropriate level of intervention along the value
chain. Second, which instruments should be used at a specic level in the vertical chain?
We consider a model with two retailers/producers who sell a di¤erentiated product and
two parcel delivery operators. The production, retailing and delivery of these goods
generates CO2 emissions. We assume that it is more expensive for the retailers and the
delivery operators to use greentechnologies. We consider di¤erent scenarios reecting
the type of competition and the vertical structure of the industry.
In all cases the equilibria are ine¢ cient for two reasons. First, at both level of
the value chain (at the production/retailing stage and the delivery stage), the levels of
emissions are too large (given the output levels - the number of items produced and
delivered). Second the levels of outputs are not e¢ cient because the cost of emissions is
not reected by the consumer prices. We show that in the perfect competition scenario a
uniform Pigouvian tax on emission, reecting the marginal social damage, is su¢ cient to
correct both types of ine¢ ciencies. Under imperfect competition a Pigouvian emissions
tax is also necessary, but it has to be supplemented by positive or negative taxes on
the quantity of good produced and delivered. The specic design of these instruments
is a¤ected by vertical integration between a retailer and a delivery operator.
Keywords: Pigouvian rule, emission taxes, output taxes, E-commerce, delivery oper-
ators, vertical integration.
JEL Codes: H21, L42, L81, L87.
1 Introduction
E-commerce has been growing signicantly and the Covid epidemic has further exacer-
bated this trend. Its expansion has been raising many regulatory issues which ranging
from competition policy questions to issues of prot shifting. But in addition to these
traditional issues the environmental impact of the sector has been subject to ever
increasing scrutiny and the appeals for policy intervention have become increasingly
pressing.
We study the design of environmental policy in the e-commerce sector. While en-
vironmental protection and particularly the limitation of CO2 emissions is a concern
that is relevant for all economic activities, the appropriate regulatory design in the
e-commerce sector raises specic questions. First, one has to determine the appropri-
ate levelof intervention along the value chain. Should the policy target the retailer,
the producer or the delivery operator? Alternatively, is an intervention at all levels
desirable and necessary? Second, which instrument should be used at a specic level
in the vertical chain? Possible options include a carbon/emissions tax that could be
levied wherever the emissions are generated or concentrated on the nal product. A
specic tax per parcel delivered at home has also been discussed. Many regulators are
also tempted by more command and controloriented policies like restrictions on the
vehicles used for delivery.
We consider a model with two retailers/producers who sell a di¤erentiated product
and two parcel delivery operators. The production, retailing and delivery of these
goods generates CO2 emissions. We assume that the cost of production and the cost
of delivery decrease with the level of emissions, at least up to some level. In other
words, it is more expensive for the producers and the delivery operators to use green
technologies. So they have no incentive to reduce their emissions despite the fact that
these emissions create a global (atmosphere) externality which is a potential source of
global warming and climate change: this negative externality is not internalized in the
individual decision of all economic actors along the value chain.
We consider di¤erent scenarios reecting the type of competition and the vertical
1
structure of the industry. In the reference scenario all rms (upstream and downstream)
are independent and behave competitively so that retail prices and delivery rates are set
at marginal costs. Then we consider a setting where all rms remain independent but
where there is imperfect competition which involves strategic interactions and yields a
(subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium. Finally, we assume that there is vertical integration
between one of the retailers and one of the delivery operators. The vertically integrated
rm may or may not exclusively deliver via its own delivery operator.
The di¤erent scenarios yield di¤erent equilibria, implying di¤erent levels of emissions
and outputs. The market structure also a¤ects the environmental policy because this
one has to account for the adjustments induced in the market and in particular the
pass-through of taxes to consumers.
In all cases the equilibria are ine¢ cient for two reasons. First, at both level of
the value chain (at the production/retailing stage and the delivery stage), the levels of
emissions are too large (given the output levels - the number of items produced and
delivered). Second the levels of outputs are not e¢ cient because the cost of emissions is
not reected by the consumer prices. Under perfect competition output levels are too
large but this e¤ect is mitigated under imperfect competition.
We show that in the perfect competition scenario a uniform Pigouvian tax on emis-
sion, reecting the marginal social damage, is su¢ cient to correct both types of ine¢ -
ciencies. The same result can be achieved by a Pigouvian subsidy on emission reductions.
Under imperfect competition a Pigouvian emissions tax is also necessary, but it has to
be supplemented by positive or negative taxes on the quantity of good produced and
delivered. The specic design of these instruments is a¤ected by vertical integration.
2 The model
Consider an e-commerce sector with two producers/retailers, j = A;B and two deliv-
ery operators, i = 1; 2. Consumer prices are denoted pA; pB and demand function by
xA(pA; pB) and xB(pA; pB). They are obtained by solving
max
xA;xB
U (xA; xB)  pAxA   pBxB (1)
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Production costs of retailers j = A;B are denoted yjkj (ej), where yj is the number




j(ej) < 0 for ej < ej and k
0
j(ej) = 0 for ej  ej : (2)
This assumption represents the property that producing and retailing in a less polluting
way is more costly. Formally this means that increasing emissions decreases cost at least
up to some level ej .
Delivery costs of operator i = 1; 2 are given by ci(yi; ei), where yi is the number of
parcels delivered and ei is emissions per parcel delivered. Assume for simplicity that:
ci(yi; ei) = Ci(yi)  i(ei)yi; (3)
where
0i(ei) > 0 for ei < ei and 
0
i(ei) = 0 for ei  ei: (4)
This is the counterpart to expression (2) and implies that delivering in a less polluting
way is more costly.1
Total emissions, E, have a social cost  (E). Observe that only total emissions
matter irrespective of their origin, which is the case for atmosphereexternalities like
CO2.
2.1 Laissez-Faire
Since there is perfect competition in the delivery segment and the services o¤ered by
operators 1 and 2 are considered as perfect substitutes, there is a unique delivery rate
r, which is endogenously determined in equilibrium to equalize demand and supply.
Delivery operators choose ei = ei for i = 1; 2. Their respective supply function yi(r) is
determined by
C 0i(yi)  i(ei) = r for i = 1; 2
1This is a reduced form of a model where the rms invest in emission reducing technologies. Formally
we would then have e  e (g) where g is investment per unit of y in reducing e and e0 (g) < 0. Rewrite
kj (e)  kj (e (gj)) and i (e)  i (e (gi)), then yields our formulations.
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Turning to the production/selling segment, retailers choose ej = ej to minimize their
production cost. By assumption, retailers are price takers so that pj = kj (ej) + r for
j = A;B.
In equilibrium demand must equal supply both in the production and the delivery
part of the value chain, where the demand for delivery services addressed to operators 1
and 2 equals total demand for goods produced and sold by retailers A and B. Formally
this is expressed by the following conditions.
yA (r) + yB (r) = y1(r) + y2(r) = xA(kA (eA) + r; kB (eB) + r) + xB(kA (eA) + r; kB (eB) + r)
yA (r) = xA(kA (eA) + r; kB (eB) + r); yB (r) = xB(kA (eA) + r; kB (eB) + r)
Total emissions are E = e1y1(r) + e2y2(r) + eAyA (r) + eByB (r).
2.2 First best allocation
The rst-best allocation (FB) is obtained by maximizing total surplus net of the social
cost of emissions. With equation (3), we obtain the following Lagrangian expression
L = U(xA; xB)  kA (eA)xA   kB (eB)xb   C1(y1) + 1(e1)y1
  C2(y2) + 2(e2)y2    (y1e1 + y2e2 + xAeA + xBeB)
  [xA + xB   y1   y2];
where  is the multiplier associated with the constraint requiring that all sales are
delivered, while y1e1 + y2e2 + xAeA + xBeB = E is the total level of emissions.
The FOCs (rst-order conditions) w.r.t xj ; yi; ej ; ei are respectively given by
@L
@xj
= Uj   kj (ej)  ej 0 (E)   = 0; (5)
@L
@yi
=  C 0i(yi) + i(ei)  ei 0(E) +  = 0; (6)
@L
@ej
=  k0j (ej) yj   yj 0 (E) = 0 (7)
@L
@ei
= 0i(ei)yi   yi 0(E) = 0 (8)







i ) =  
0 (E) (9)
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These equations state that the private marginal benet (cost reduction) of emissions
from retailer j and delivery operator i should be equal to the marginal social damage
per unit of good produced and delivered.
Equation (6) implies that
C 01(y

1)  1(e1) + e1 0(E) = C 02(y2)  2(e2) + e2 0(E) (10)
so that the social marginal cost of delivering one parcel should be the same for the two
delivery operators.














This equation states that the marginal willingness to pay for good j should be equal to
the sum of private and social marginal cost of producing and delivering it.
2.3 Decentralization
We now study how the FB allocation can be decentralized under perfect competition.
Potential instruments are: a linear tax on each unit of good produced tj , a linear tax
on each parcel delivered i and a linear tax on the pollution emitted by producing and
delivering the good  .
Retailer j solves for given prices pj and 
max
yj ;ej
(pj   tj) yj   ryj   yjkj (ej)  yjej : (12)
The FOCs w.r.t yj and ej are given by
(pj   tj)  r   kj (ej)  ej = 0 (13)
  yjk0j (ej)  yj = 0 (14)
Parcel delivery operator i solves
max
yi;ei
(r   i) yi   Ci(yi) + i(ei)yi   yiei (15)
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The FOCs w.r.t yi and ei are given by
(r   i)  C 0i(yi) + i(ei)  ei = 0 (16)
0(ei)yi   yi = 0 (17)
The FOCs of the consumersproblem (1) are given by
Uj   pj = 0 (18)
From (14) and (17) and using (9), we must have:
 =  0(E) (19)
This is the classical equation of a Pigouvian taxation of emissions. Furthermore, com-
bining (13), (16), (18) and (19) yields (11) with tj = i = 0.
In words, the optimal solution can be achieved by a uniform tax on emissions at all
levels (production and delivery). As explained above, what matters is the total amount
of emissions irrespective of their origins. So it is relevant to tax in the same way a
ton of CO2 whatever it is emitted during the production or the delivery phase. This
result is quite remarkable because we are able to correct two ine¢ ciencies generated by
a laissez-faire approach with a same and unique tool, contrary to the classical rule of
one instrument for one issue. In this LF situation, (i) the level of emissions per unit
of output is too large (both upstream and downstream); (ii) the consumer price does
not reect the social cost of pollution so that output levels will be too large. As usual,
the emissions tax achieves the correct level of emissions. Furthermore, under perfect
competition with marginal cost pricing, the tax is fully reected in the price charged by
producers. Consequently, the consumer price also increases so that it now reects the
(marginal) social cost of emissions and solve the second ine¢ ciency.
Before turning to imperfect competition, two remarks are in order.
2.3.1 Subsidizing emission reduction
Note that rather than taxing emissions we could subsidize emission reductions (e ei)yi.
Denoting the subsidy s, the producer and delivery operators prot functions would then
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respectively be given by
j = (pj   tj) yj   ryj   yjkj (ej) + s (ej   ej) yj
i = ryi   Ci(yi) + i(ei)yi + s(ei   ei)yi;
which di¤ers from (12) and (15) only by a constant so that nothing changes and we
have of course
s =  0(E):
This may at rst be surprising, but one has to realize that when emissions reductions
are subsidized, emissions have a positive marginal cost: increasing ej and ei reduces
the subsidy!
2.3.2 Ine¢ ciency of uniform quotas
Another interesting point is that the FB implies in general that delivery operators and
producers have di¤erent emission levels (unless their cost functions are identical). The
solution will imply thus di¤erent emissions levels (per unit of output) for the di¤erent
actors. Consequently uniform emissions quotas or emission standards cannot implement
the FB and may actually reduce welfare.
3 Imperfect competition
While the perfect competition case provides an interesting benchmark, in reality market
power appears to be pervasive in the e-commerce sector. Consequently it is important
to revisit our analysis in a setting of imperfect competition, possibly combined with
vertical integration. Market power typically implies that rms reduce their output in
order to keep prices high. Now, when the good is polluting this output reduction may,
at least in part, be socially desirable. However, imperfect competition does not in itself
provide any incentives to retailers or delivery operators to adopt cleaner production
technologies.
We study two settings of imperfect competition. In the rst one, there is no vertical
integration and all retailers and delivery operators are independent. In the second one
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we assume that one of the retailers is vertically integrated with a delivery operator. We
further assume that the integrated delivery operator only delivers the product sold by the
integrated rm, but the latter may choose to deliver part of its sales via the independent
delivery operator. Alternative types of vertical restraints could be considered but to
avoid a multiplication of scenarios, we concentrate on this empirically appealing case.
3.1 Independent retailers and delivery operators
The model is similar to the basic model with emissions both in production and in
delivery. However, we no longer assume perfect competitions. We introduce the taxes
considered above from the outset (to avoid repetitions). Recall that these are a linear
tax on each unit of output produced tj , a linear tax on each parcel delivered i and a
linear tax on emissions generated by the production and the delivery  . The laissez-faire
equilibrium can be obtained by setting all the taxes equal to zero. The timing, inspired
by Borsenberger et al. (2021), is as follows.
1. Delivery operators choose r1; e1 and r2; e2.
2. Retailers choose pA; eA and pB; eB.
3. Consumers choose xA and xB.
We determine the subgame perfect equilibrium and solve the game by backward
induction.
3.1.1 Equilibrium
Stage 3 Nothing changes for consumers who continue to solve (1), yielding demand
functions xj (pA; pB) for j = A;B.
Stage 2 Retailer j chooses pj ; ej to solve
maxj = (pj   tj  min fr1; r2g   kj (ej)  ej)xj (pA; pB) :
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The FOCs are given by
xj + (pj   tj  min fr1; r2g   kj (ej)  ej)
@xj
@pj
= 0 for j = A;B; (20)
 k0j (ej)   = 0; (21)
which yields xj (tj ;min fr1; r2g ; ) and ej ().
Stage 1 Delivery operators solve
max
r;ei
i = (ri   i + i(ei)  ei) yi   Ci(yi):
Since delivery services are prefect substitutes we have Bertrand competition which, with
a strictly convex cost function yields marginal cost pricing so that
r = i   i(ei) + ei + C 0i(yi) for i = 1; 2 (22)
0i(ei)   = 0 (23)
In words each delivery operator chooses the same delivery price because otherwise the
operator with the higher price has a zero demand from retailers.
3.1.2 Implementation of the FB
The rst-best solution is the same as the one derived in Section 2.2. Recall that in a
rst best one has to satisfy equation (9) so that one needs again
 =  0 (E) .
In words the emissions tax continues to be given by the Pigouvian rule. With this
level of emission taxes equation (10) continues to be satised because of pure Bertrand
competition on the delivery side.
On the retailer side, we have
Uj = kj (ej) + C
0
i(yi)  i(ei) + (ei + ej) 0(E);
so that the social marginal cost of delivery is equalized across retailers.
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However, we now need one more instrument to insure that consumer prices are set at
the optimal level. This is because under imperfect competition an increase in marginal
cost is not passed on to consumers on a one by one basis. Combining (20) and (22), we
have:










< 0; j = A;B (24)
and i = 0; (25)
or
tj = 0




< 0, i = 1; 2:
This is in line with the classical result that under imperfect competition imple-
menting the FB requires a subsidy because prices are too high. In our case, either the
production or the delivery must be subsidized.
As already mentioned in the laissez-faire equilibrium where emissions are not taxed,
this e¤ect goes in the right direction because it reduces output, which is otherwise too
large because of pollution. Depending on the cost of pollution and the extent of market
power, the output may the be smaller or larger than the socially optimal one. However,
when emissions are taxed, we return to the case where market power is detrimental to
welfare, since price will be too large.
3.2 Integrated rm I and foreclosure
We now assume that retailer A and delivery operator 1 are vertically integrated. We
refer to them as the integrated rm I. We assume that the integrated delivery operator
(operator 1) delivers exclusively retailer As product. In that sense there is foreclosure.
However, retailer A may decide to have part of its sales delivered by operator 2, as long
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as this proofs protable. Well see below (in particular in the numerical examples) that
this may or may not be the case. Indeed, there are two conicting e¤ects. On the one
hand delivery costs are convex which pleads for using both delivery operators. However,
in this situation delivery operator 2 has market power and sets its price above marginal
cost, a situation that does not encourage the integrated rm to use operator 2s parcel
delivery services.
The timing is as follows:
1. The independent delivery operator chooses r2,e2
2. The integrated rm chooses pA; eA and e1 and  which is the proportion of xA that
is delivered by delivery operator 2 at price r2. Note that a corner solution with
 = 0 is possible if the markup of operator 2 is large. The independent retailer
simultaneously chooses pB, eB for a given delivery price r2.
3. Consumers choose xA and xB given prices pA and pB.
Stage 3 is the same as in the previous sections so that we concentrate on the other
two stages.
3.2.1 Stage 2
The integrated rm chooses:
max
pA;;eA;e1
(pA   tA   kA (eA)  eA)xA (pA; pB) + (1(e1)  1   e1) (1  )xA (pA; pB)
  C1 ((1  )xA (pA; pB))  r2xA (pA; pB) :
The FOCs are
xA + (pA   tA   kA (eA)  eA + (1(e1)  1   e1) (1  )




 1(e1) + 1 + e1 + C 01 ((1  )xA)  r2 = 0 (27)
 k0A (eA)   = 0 (28)
01(e1)   = 0 (29)
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We assume an interior solution for all variables except possibly for  for which a corner
solution at  = 0 is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. As discussed above and
illustrated by the numerical examples below, the integrated rm may prefer to deliver
all its parcels via its own delivery operator.
The independent retailer B chooses pB and eB such that:
max
pB ;eB
B = (pB   tB   r2   kB (eB)  eB)xB (pA; pB)
The FOCs are




 k0B (eB)   = 0 (31)
Each players FOCs implicitly dene their best-response functions and the Nash equi-
librium must satisfy all of them. This yields the equilibrium of the second stage induced
by the choices of the independent delivery operator (r2; e2) made in the rst stage and
by the various taxes pA (tA; tB; r2; ; 1 2), pB (tA; tB; r2; ; 1; 2),  (tA; tB; r2; ; 1; 2),
eA (), eB (), e1 ().
3.2.2 Stage 1
The independent delivery operator chooses r2; e2 anticipating the induced equilibrium
in stage 2. Formally, it solves
max
r2;e2
(r2   2 + 2(e2)  e2) (xB (pA (:) ; pB (:)) +  (:)xApA (:) ; pB (:))
  C2 (xB (pA (:) ; pB (:)) +  (:)xA (pA (:) ; pB (:))) : (32)
The FOCs are given in Appendix A.1.
3.3 Implementation
We now examine how the rst-best solution can be achieved with this game by the use
of the considered tax instruments.
First, it follows from (8), (7), (29) and (31) that we again need a linear Pigouvian
tax on emissions so that
 =  0 (E) :
12
To obtain the levels of the other instruments we again have to combine the FOC for the
rst-best with those characterizing the equilibrium of the game and then solve for the

















The rst two of these conditions are identical to their counterparts obtained with
independent rms because they are evaluated at the FB to be implemented which is the
same in both cases. Consequently, they have the same interpretation. The new feature
is that we now need 2 as an additional instrument. This is necessary because delivery
operator 2s rates no longer reect marginal costs. Consequently, a correction is needed
to achieve the e¢ cient allocation of parcels across operators. The property that 2 is
negative (the independent delivery operator must be subsidized) arises because the rate
of operator 2 is too high (because of its market power over retailer B).
4 Numerical illustrations
To illustrate our results we now present some numerical examples. They provide some
extra insights even though our analytical results are unambiguous. In particular, they
allow us to examine how various asymmetries in costs and the environmental quality of
production technologies a¤ect the orders of magnitude of the various e¤ects. Further-
more, they show that we can indeed have interior as well as corner solutions for  in
the scenario with the integrated rm.
4.1 The specication
We used a quadratic utility which yields linear demands. The goods produced by
retailers A and B are substitutes. Formally, consumer surplus CS is given by CS =
U (xA; xB) +m  pAxA   pBxB where m is the consumers revenues and U is assumed
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quadratic and given by
U = a1xA + a2xB   b1x2A  2 b2x2B   xAxB
This yields the following expression for the demand function
xA (pA; pB) =
1
4b1b2   2
[2 (a1   pA) b2   a2 + pB] ;
xB (pA; pB) =
1
4b1b2   2
[2 (a2   pB) b1   a1 + pA] ;
where we assume that
(i) bi > 0, i = 1; 2 so that demands are decreasing in their own price,
(ii)  = @xA=@pB = @xB=@pA > 0 so that the goods xA and xB are substitutes
because the cross-price elasticity is positive
and (iii) 4b1b2   2 > 0 to ensure concavity of utilities.
Retailersunit cost of production is dened by
kj (e) = j + (e  ej)2 for e  ej ;
= j otherwise,
where j > 0. Note that
k
0
j (e) = 2 (e  e) for e  e
The costs of delivery operator i to deliver y parcels ci(y; e) are given by
ci(y; e) = Ci (y) + yi (ei)
where
Ci (y) = (i=2) y
2
and
i (e) = i + (ei   ei)2 for ei  ei
= i otherwise,
14
where i > 0 and i > 0. These cost functions satisfy the assumptions made in the
analytical part and their interpretations are in line with those discussed there.
The social cost of emissions is given by
 (E) = 'E
so that the marginal cost of emissions is constant. Within the context of climate change
this would be the social cost of a ton of CO2.
4.2 Illustrative results
We start with a symmetric benchmark scenario. The illustration uses the following
parameters in the benchmark/symmetric scenario: a = 100, b = 2,  = 3, e = 1,  = 1,
 = 1,  = 1, ' = 5.2 Then we introduce various types of asymmetries.
In all tables, LF1 refers to the competitive equilibrium; LF2 is the equilibrium with
imperfect competition and independent retailers and delivery operators (subsection 3.1);
LF3 is the equilibrium with imperfect competition and foreclosure (subsection 3.2).
We know from theory that emission taxes are given by  = ' = 5 in all scenarios.
To avoid repetition we do not report this in each table. We also know that under perfect
competition (case LF1) this is the only instrument we need.
4.2.1 Example 1: benchmark/symmetric scenario
The di¤erent allocations are given in Table 1.3
When rms are independent (case LF2), we have tA = tB =  0:046 while 1 = 2 =
0: the production of the goods is subsidized (as noticed in the analytical part of the
paper, one could consider the reverse scenario where the delivery is subsidized instead
of the production). We can calculate these levels based on the FB without actually
calculating LF2. The fact that tA = tB is of course due to the symmetry of the rms.
On the other hand, 1 = 2 = 0 (or if we consider the reverse scenario where the delivery
is subsidized instead of the production, tA = tB = 0) is a general result we already know
from the analytical model.
2We have dropped the subscripts because we assume perfect symmetry in the benchmark scenario
to that the parameters apply to both retailers or delivery operators.
3 In LF3, 1 represents the prots of the integrated rm.
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LF1 FB LF2 LF3
xA 12 11:51 9:48 11:62
xB 12 11:51 9:48 5:84
y1 12 11:51 9:48 11:62
y2 12 11:51 9:48 5:84
pA 16 19:39 31:07 35:96
pB 16 19:39 31:07 41:75
m 13 14:45 10:84 28:52
e1 1 0:28 1 1
e2 1 0:28 1 1
eA 1 0:28 1 1
eB 1 0:28 1 1
E 48 13 39 34
CS 1008 928 678 542
A 0 0 169  
B 0 0 169 59
1 72 66 48 304
2 72 66 48 143
SWF 912 995 917 803
Table 1: Benchmark scenario.
With integrated rm and foreclosure (case LF3), we have again tA = tB =  0:046 but
2 =  0:082, while 1 = 0: not only the retailers but also the independent delivery oper-
ator are subsidized. We know from the analytical results that tA and tB are the same as
in the case LF2. Without these taxes, LF3 leads to bundling and foreclosure, that is the
integrated rm does not use the services o¤ered by the independent delivery operator.
We now examine various asymmetric scenarios, which provide a stylized representa-
tion of di¤erences in the current environmental properties of the production technologies
across delivery operators. Each scenario is identied by the parameters that di¤er from
the benchmark scenario.
4.2.2 Scenario 2: 1 = 0:8, e1 = 1, e2 = 0:8, 2 = 1
This scenario represents a scenario in which the independent delivery operator is cur-
rently less polluting than its competitor so that its costs are higher. The results are
presented in Table 2.
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Scenario LF1 FB LF2 LF3
xA 12,14 11,68 9,96 11,78
xB 12,14 11,68 9,96 5,89
y1 12,24 11,55 10,06 11,78
y2 12,04 11,82 9,86 5,89
pA 15,04 18,23 30,29 35,20
pB 15,04 18,23 30,29 41,08
m 13,04 14,29 10,86 28,76
e1 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
e2 0,80 0,23 0,80 0,80
eA 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
eB 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
CS 1031,23 955,31 694,27 555,36
E 46,14 12,68 37,86 34,17
A 0,00 0,00 173,57 312,23
B 0,00 0,00 173,57 60,81
1 74,88 66,67 50,59
2 71,97 69,82 48,21 146,29
SWF 947,37 1028,42 950,88 903,84
tA tB 2
-0,049 -0,049 -0,095
Table 2: Scenario 2: 1 = 0:8, e1 = 1, e2 = 0:8, 2 = 1
Qualitatively the outcomes in this case are similar to the benchmark scenario. We
have again bundling in case LF3 and we continue to have 2 < 0. Interestingly the
asymmetries in delivery costs do not a¤ect the symmetry of the subsidies on the retailers.
This may be at rst sight surprising since, due to the possibility to have the corner
solution for , marginal costs di¤er in LF3. However, the FB which is implemented
requires that marginal delivery costs are equalized which, along with the fact that
demands are symmetric, explains that the ts are equal.
4.2.3 Scenario 3: 1 = 1, e1 = 1, e2 = 0:8, 2 = 0:1
This scenario returns to the case where the s are the same for all delivery operators.
Like in the previous one operator 2 is cleaner (so its delivery services are most costly all
others things being equal) but now has a less convex cost function (so its services are
less costly all others things being equal, for instance because it is the incumbent and
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Scenario LF1 FB LF2 LF3
xA 13,51 13,03 10,86 10,02
xB 13,51 13,03 10,86 10,02
y1 2,46 1,94 1,97 9,30
y2 24,56 24,11 19,75 10,74
pA 5,46 8,82 23,98 29,84
pB 5,46 8,82 23,98 29,84
m 3,46 4,88 2,97 10,30
e1 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
e2 0,80 0,23 0,80 0,80
eA 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
eB 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
CS 1276,95 1187,71 825,58 703,19
E 49,11 13,51 39,49 37,94
A 0,00 0,00 206,40 219,05
B 0,00 0,00 206,40 175,80
1 3,02 1,88 1,95
2 29,17 29,06 18,70 94,16
SWF 1063,56 1151,11 1061,58 1002,49
tA tB 2
-0,044 -0,044 -0,154
Table 3: Scenario 3: 1 = 1, e1 = 1, e2 = 0:8, 2 = 0:1
has a larger scale of activity).
The main contribution of this scenario is that it yields an interior solution in LF3
(a share of the items produced and sold by the integrated rm is delivered by the
independent parcel operator) thereby showing that this is indeed a possibility (see Table
3). Intuitively, this case occurs when the independent delivery operators cost advantage
dominates the market power e¤ect and as this example suggests this requires a quite
drastic di¤erence in the degree of convexity of delivery costs.
4.2.4 Scenario 4: 1 = 0:8, e1 = 1, e2 = 0:8, 2 = 1
This scenario is similar to Scenario 2, except that the cost advantage of the more
polluting operator is reected by a lesser degree of convexity of delivery cost. The
results presented in Table 4 are not very di¤erent from Table 2 which suggests that
what matters is the cost advantage and not so much its exact specication (constant or
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Scenario LF1 FB LF2 LF3
xA 12,30 11,83 10,06 12,18
xB 12,30 11,83 10,06 5,74
y1 13,66 12,88 11,18 12,18
y2 10,93 10,78 8,95 5,74
pA 13,93 17,19 29,56 34,06
pB 13,93 17,19 29,56 40,50
m 11,93 13,25 9,95 28,45
e1 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
e2 0,80 0,23 0,80 0,80
eA 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
eB 1,00 0,29 1,00 1,00
CS 1058,30 979,76 708,90 572,37
E 47,00 12,90 38,46 34,69
A 0,00 0,00 177,23 318,95
B 0,00 0,00 177,23 57,67
1 74,66 66,40 50,01
2 59,29 58,07 39,65 141,11
SWF 957,27 1039,71 960,70 916,64
tA tB 2
-0,048 -0,048 -0,102
Table 4: Scenario 4: 1 = 0:8, e1 = 1, e1 = 0:8, 2 = 1
quadratic term).
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the design of environmental policy in the e-commerce sector. We
have considered a model with two retailers/producers who sell a di¤erentiated product
and two delivery operators. The production, retailing and delivery of these goods gen-
erate CO2 emissions. At all levels of the value chain, it is more expensive to use green
technologies.
We have considered di¤erent scenarios reecting the type of competition and the
vertical structure of the industry. In all cases the equilibria are ine¢ cient for two
reasons. First, both upstream and downstream the levels of emissions are too large
(given the output levels). Second the levels of outputs are not e¢ cient because the cost
19
of emissions is not reected by the consumer prices.
We have shown that under perfect competition a uniform Pigouvian tax on emission,
reecting the marginal social damage, is su¢ cient to correct both types of ine¢ ciencies.
The same result can be achieved by a Pigouvian subsidy on emission reductions. Under
imperfect competition a Pigouvian emissions tax is also necessary, but it has to be
supplemented by positive or negative taxes on delivery and production. The specic
design of these instruments is a¤ected by vertical integration.
This paper represents just a rst step, and can be extended in various directions.
First, we have lumped together production and retail. Separating them would add an-
other layer in the vertical chain and allow for richer representations of vertical restraints.
Our main results can be expected to remain valid in such a setting, in particular the
optimality of a Pigouvian emissions tax. However, more instruments would be needed
at the retail and production levels.
Second, we have neglected two of the issues traditionally dealt with in taxation
models, namely, the necessity to raise government revenue, and the redistributive (and
probably regressive) impact of environmental taxation; see Sandmo (1974), Cremer et
al. (1998, 2010) and Goulder (1995). This would make us leave the realm of a rst-best
solution and require a second-best analysis. While this might have a drastic impact on
the output taxes the results of Cremer and Gahvari (2001) suggest that we can expect
that the Pigouvian rule would continue to apply for the taxation of emissions (as these
do not directly determine consumer prices).
Last and not least, we have neglected the possibility that consumers might care
about the environmental friendliness of the products and particularly the delivery; see
for instance Cremer and Thisse (1999). In that case delivery operators would no longer
be considered as perfect substitutes and the consumersenvironmental concern would
internalizepart of the externality and thus lead to an amended Pigouvian rule (re-
ecting merely the cost which is not spontaneously accounted for by consumers). Since
this might fundamentally a¤ect the strategic interactions and the specication of the
game it would require drastic changes in the model. In other words this would not be
a mere extension, but essentially represent a di¤erent paper. All of these issue are on
20
our research agenda for the future.
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A.1 First-order conditions of problem 32
The FOCs are:
xB + xA +
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A.2 Proof of expressions (33)(35)
From (26), one has:
UA = tA + kA (eA) + eA 
0 (E) 
 
1(e1)  1   e1 0 (E)

(1  )




Using (27), one has
r2 =  1(e1) + 1 + e1 0 (E) + C 01 ((1  )xA)
so that after substitution:
UA = tA + kA (eA) + eA 





Combining (30) and (A:1) yields:
UB = tB + 2   2(e2) + e2 0 (E) + C 02 (xB +  (:)xA (:))











Moreover, combining (27) and (A:1), we have:
 1(e1)+1 + e1 0 (E) + C 01 ((1  )xA) = (A.5)





Thus equalizing (11) for j = A;B; (10) to respectively (A:3) ; (A:4) and (A:5), one
can implement the rst best with the levels of the instruments dened by equations
(33)(35).
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